Subjects: Psychology >> Applied Psychology submitted time 2024-01-15
Abstract： As artificial intelligence continues to advance, algorithms find increasing applications across various domains, including education and transportation. In the realm of road traffic management, the escalating complexity of the traffic system poses challenges for traditional human monitoring, such as that carried out by traffic police. In light of this, there is a growing reliance on algorithmic monitoring, exemplified by electronic police systems. These systems offer extensive monitoring capabilities in terms of both time and space, providing an efficient means to uphold traffic order in the face of manual monitoring limitations. In order to enhance individuals’ inclination and adherence to traffic rules, algorithmic monitoring serves as a compelling alternative to address the shortcomings of manual monitoring, which often involves blind spots and high operational costs. Observations from daily life experiences suggest that the broad coverage of algorithmic monitoring has a mitigating effect on traffic rule violations. Despite this intuitive understanding, there exists a notable gap in empirical research to substantiate these observations. While numerous studies have delved into the impact of algorithms, yielding findings related to both algorithm appreciation and aversion, there remains a need for a focused investigation into the specific influence of algorithmic monitoring on compliance with traffic rules and an exploration of the underlying mechanisms.
This research aims to address this gap by providing a nuanced understanding of how algorithmic monitoring shapes individuals’ behavior in the context of obeying traffic rules. Drawing on construal-level theory, prior research has consistently shown that individuals tend to perceive humans at a high level of construal, while algorithms are typically construed at a low level. Moreover, traffic behaviors are also construed at different levels. Recognizing that the alignment of construal levels between the agent and behavior plays a pivotal role in influencing individuals, this paper posits a hypothesis: the effect of algorithmic monitoring on compliance with traffic rules hinges on the construal level of the traffic behavior, and the fit between the monitoring agent and monitored behavior acts as a mediating factor in this relationship. To address these considerations and test the proposed hypothesis, a preliminary investigation was conducted, selecting traffic behaviors with distinct construal levels (e.g., overspeed behavior as a low construal-level, and failure to give way to pedestrians as a high construal-level). In Study 1a, a situational test involving the de We found that for traffic behaviors with low construal levels, compared to human monitoring, people had a stronger sense of fit with algorithmic monitoring, thereby enhancing their intention to comply with traffic rules. Conversely, for traffic behaviors with high construal levels, there was a stronger sense of fit under human monitoring, leading to a greater compliance intention with traffic rules. In summary, the monitoring agent influences individuals’ intention to comply with traffic rules for behaviors at different construal levels, with the sense of fit playing an intermediate role. Further, after committing an error, the sense of fit induced by algorithmic monitoring decreased to a level comparable to human monitoring. Additionally, the positive effect on the intention to comply with traffic rules for behaviors with low construal levels disappeared. However, following an error in human monitoring, its monitoring effectiveness (i.e., compliance with traffic rules) for behaviors with high construal levels remained superior to that of algorithmic monitoring. Moreover, the mediating role of the sense of fit persisted. In essence, the monitoring effectiveness of algorithms is more significantly influenced by error information.
In summary, the enhancing effect of algorithmic monitoring on the intention to comply with traffic rules depends on the construal level of the observed traffic behavior, with the sense of fit playing a mediation role. Errors in algorithmic monitoring weaken its monitoring effectiveness for traffic behaviors with low construal levels. Hence, when the traffic management department chooses the monitoring agent, it should avoid indiscriminately using either algorithmic or human monitoring but consider the construal levels of traffic violations observed at the intersection.
Peer Review Status:
Awaiting Review
Subjects: Psychology >> Social Psychology submitted time 2023-03-27 Cooperative journals: 《心理学报》
Abstract： How do humans learn to trust unfamiliar others? Decisions in the absence of direct knowledge rely on our ability to generalize from past experiences and are often shaped by the degree of similarity between prior experience and novel situations. Previous study has suggested that people prefer to trust toward strangers who resemble the original player they previously learned was trustworthy and avoid trusting toward strangers resembling the untrustworthy player. However, it is still unclear whether this stimulus generalization effect exist across different situations, and the role of intention perception in this effect. Here, we leverage a stimulus generalization framework to examine how perceptual similarity between known individuals and unfamiliar strangers across different interactive situations shapes people’s trust toward strangers. Given that the strong adaptability of stimulus generalization mechanism, we speculated that the faces associated with different degrees of unfairness will affect the individual's trust towards similar unfamiliar faces, and intention perception modulate this process. Three experiments were conducted to examine the above hypothesis. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, participants play or observe an iterative ultimatum game with three partners who exhibit highly unfair, medium unfair, or highly fair behavior. After learning who was fair/unfair allocator, participants select new partners for a trust game. Unbeknownst to participants, each potential new partner was parametrically morphed with one of the three original players. In Experiment 3, participants play a similar iterative ultimatum game with three partners, nevertheless the allocations were generated by a computer algorithm which excludes the intention of the allocator. Under this unintentional situation, the above-mentioned cross-situational generalization effect disappeared. A mixed logistic regression was performed, where both trustworthiness type (whether faces were morphed with the original fair, medium unfair, unfair) and perceptual similarity (increasing similarity to the original players, 23%, 34%, 45%, 56%, 67%, 78%) were entered as predictors of choosing to play with the morph. The result of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 show that compared with the medium unfair condition, as the perceptual similarity between the morphed trustee’s face and the face of the fair (unfair) allocator in the previous interaction increases, the degree of trust (distrust) towards the trustee gradually increases. In addition, this effect is asymmetry, participants preferentially avoided the unfair morphs more so than engaging with the fair morphs suggests an asymmetric overgeneralization toward individuals perceived to be morally aversive. In Experiment 3, under unintentional situation, the above-mentioned cross-situational generalization effect disappeared. The results of Experiment 3 show that the perception of behavioral intention play an important role in the generation of the stimulus generalization effect. Together, our results demonstrate that the individual uses the associative learning mechanism to capture the moral information of the interactive objects from the past experience, and then guides subsequent trust decision-making. This mechanism draws on prior learning to reduce the uncertainty associated with strangers, ultimately facilitating potentially adaptive decisions to trust, or withhold trust from, unfamiliar others.
Subjects: Psychology >> Social Psychology submitted time 2023-03-27 Cooperative journals: 《心理学报》
Abstract： The recognition of the intentions of observed actions or behaviors is an important social function in the human visual system. Previous research has invested much effort into understanding how the human vision system recognizes object-directed intentions of actions (i.e., actions are implemented to approach physical objects without influencing others). However, actions are also directed to social entities or agents to impact others, which is defined as social intentions (or social interaction intentions).This study aimed to investigate how vision systems recognize social intentions. For the purpose of demonstrating that individuals involved in social interaction are rational and should maximize the utility of actions overall, this paper proposes the hypothesis that when the costs of Agent A helping Agent B to achieve the goal state are less than the costs of Agent B acting alone to achieve this goal state (i.e., cue of minimizing cost), these two agents are recognized with social intentions.To test the above hypothesis, we manipulated the theory of minimizing costs by presenting cartoonized animations that depict how two agents move and influence each other. Specifically, a movable Agent A placed an apple in front of Agent B, who is always stationary. In front of Agent B, a fence was either set in place or not, to operationalize the costs of Agent B achieving the target (i.e., the apple). In this case, when a fence was placed in front of Agent B, his path of achieving the target was blocked; accordingly, when Agent A pushed the apple to the front of Agent B and helped Agent B achieve the target, the costs of Agent B (i.e., path) to achieve the target were less than when Agent B achieved the target alone. However, when there was no fence in front of Agent B, the costs of Agent B achieving the target alone were less than the costs of Agent A helping Agent B to achieve the target. In brief, only when there was a fence in front of Agent B, the actions of Agent A in placing the apple in front of Agent B aligns with the information of minimizing costs, and can be recognized as a social intention; when there was no fence in front of Agent B, the object-directed intention should be attributed, as Agent A approached the target of the apple. To identify the recognized intentions of actions, we measured μ suppression (electroencephalogram oscillations within the 8~13 Hz range in the sensorimotor regions; namely, C3 and C4 channels) related to action understanding. It was suggested that the functional grouping of two individuals in social intentions should induce greater suppression of the representation of individual object-directed actions. To strictly control for the possible low-level differences, the action of Agent A, placing the apple in front of Agent B (i.e., transferring action) was paired with the action of Agent A, placing the apple in front of a stone (i.e., disposing action), which was typically recognized as an object-directed intention, whether the fence was present or not. Each action lasted two seconds, and participants were asked to count the fillers (i.e., incomplete actions) when watching the actions presented on the screen.In Experiment 1, when the fence was present in front of Agent B, the transferring action (M = -17.3% relative to the baseline) induced more μ suppression than the disposing action (M = -8.5%). More importantly, the occipital α with the same frequency band as μ was not modulated by the action type, but this component was suggested to be functional with attentional mechanisms. These results were further confirmed by cluster-based permutation tests without selecting the channels of interest. In Experiment 2, to test whether the effect in Experiment 1 was dependent upon the information of minimizing costs, the fence was removed and accordingly, the critical information was absent. We found that the difference in μ suppression between transferring and disposing actions was insignificant when the fence was not present.To further test the hypothesis proposed in this study, we used a behavioral indicator (i.e., measuring the sensitivity of changes). We manipulated the information of minimizing costs, as in Experiments 1 and 2, but participants engaged in a change detection task. In this task, a set of identical actions were memorized in sequence and participants were required to detect whether anything changed in the test animation compared to those previously memorized. It has been suggested that chunking results in more efficient processing of the configuration (e.g., encoding of interactants’ identity), but involves a cost for the individual parts within it, resulting in a memory confusion effect. Hence, if Agent A is perceived as having a social intention toward Agent B, they should be chunked in memory. Accordingly, participants would be less likely to detect changes within the interaction (i.e., the roles of Agents A and B in an interaction were swapped during the test; defined as role swap), but would be more likely to detect changes in pair composition (i.e., the recipient in an interaction was replaced by the recipient from another interaction, defined as structure change) relative to kinematically identical non-social transferring actions.It was found that in Experiment 3a, when the fence was placed in front of Agent B in the role swap condition, participants were more sensitive to such change in the disposing action (M = 1.97, SE = 0.25) than to the transferring action (M =1.38, SE = 0.24); by contrast, in the structure change condition, the sensitivity of detecting such change in the transferring action (M = 2.04, SE = 0.21) was higher than that of the disposing action (M = 1.51, SE = 0.23). In Experiment 3b, when there was no fence in front of Agent B, participants were even more sensitive to the role swap change than the structure change, but it was not influenced by the action type.It has been widely suggested that the disposing action is attributed to an object-directed intention (i.e., regardless of whether the fence was present or not) and the recognized social intention should induce greater suppression and higher sensitivity for a structure change and lower sensitivity for a role swap change than the recognized object-directed intention. Hence, we concluded that the results, in which the transferring action induced more μ suppression and higher sensitivity for a structure change and lower sensitivity for a role swap change than the disposing action (i.e., when the fence was present), were attributed to the fact that the transferring action was recognized as having a social intention. However, this recognition depends on the information of minimizing costs; otherwise, the difference in μ suppression and different sensitivities of changes between transferring and disposing actions would be observed as well, when the fence was not present. Hence, this study provides solid evidence that when the costs of Agent A helping Agent B to achieve the goal state are less than the costs of Agent B acting alone to achieve this goal state (i.e., minimizing costs), they are recognized with social intentions.
Subjects: Psychology >> Social Psychology submitted time 2022-11-22
Abstract：
How do humans learn to trust unfamiliar others? Decisions in the absence of direct knowledge rely on our ability to generalize from past experiences and are often shaped by the degree of similarity between prior experience and novel situations. A previous study suggested that people prefer to trust toward strangers who resemble the original player they previously learned was trustworthy and avoid trusting toward strangers resembling the untrustworthy player. However, it is still unclear whether this stimulus generalization effect exists across different situations, and the role of intention perception in this effect. Here, we leverage a stimulus generalization framework to examine how perceptual similarity between known individuals and unfamiliar strangers across different interactive situations shapes people’s trust toward strangers. Given that the strong adaptability of the stimulus generalization mechanism, we assume that the faces associated with different degrees of unfairness will affect the individual's trust towards similar unfamiliar faces, and intention perception modulates this process.
Three experiments were conducted to examine the above hypothesis. In Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b, participants play or observe an iterative ultimatum game with three partners who exhibit highly unfair, medium unfair, or highly fair behavior. After learning who was the fair/unfair allocator, participants select new partners for a trust game. Unbeknownst to participants, each potential new partner was parametrically morphed with one of the three original players. In Experiment 2, participants play a similar iterative ultimatum game with three partners, nevertheless the allocations were generated by a computer algorithm which excludes the intention of the allocator.
A mixed linear regression was conducted, with both (un)fairness type (whether faces were morphed with the original fair, medium unfair, unfair allocator’ face) and perceptual similarity (increasing similarity to the original face, 23%, 34%, 45%, 56%, 67%, 78%) were entered as predictors of choosing to play with the morphed face. The result of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b show that compared with the medium unfair condition, as the perceptual similarity between the morphed trustee’s face and the face of the fair (unfair) allocator in the previous interaction increases, the degree of trust (distrust) towards the trustee gradually increases. In addition, this effect is asymmetrical, participants preferentially avoided more the unfair morphs in comparison with the fair morphs. This suggests an asymmetric overgeneralization toward individuals perceived to be morally aversive. Using Drift-Diffusion Modeling (DDM), we found that the drift rate ν under unfair condition is significantly smaller than that under medium unfair or fair conditions, and most of them are in the range of less than 0. This suggests that individuals are more likely to accumulate evidence of distrust when making trust decisions about unfamiliar faces that are similar to the allocator who was unfair in previous interactions. In Experiment 2, under an unintentional situation, the above-mentioned cross-situational generalization effect disappeared.
Together, our results demonstrate that the individuals use the associative learning mechanism to capture the moral information of the interactive objects from the past experience, and then guides subsequent trust decision-making. This mechanism draws on prior learning to reduce the uncertainty associated with strangers, ultimately facilitating potentially adaptive decisions to trust, or withhold trust from unfamiliar others.
Peer Review Status:Awaiting Review
Subjects: Psychology >> Cognitive Psychology submitted time 2021-09-05
Abstract： The recognition of the intentions of observed actions or behaviors is an important social function in the human visual system. Previous research has invested much effort into understanding how the human vision system recognizes object-directed intentions of actions (i.e., actions are implemented to approach physical objects without influencing others). However, actions are also directed to social entities or agents to impact others, which is defined as social intentions (or social interaction intentions). This study aimed to investigate how vision systems recognize social intentions. For the purpose of demonstrating that individuals involved in social interaction are rational and should maximize the utility of actions overall, this paper proposes the hypothesis that when the costs of Agent A helping Agent B to achieve the goal state are less than the costs of Agent B acting alone to achieve this goal state (i.e., cue of minimizing cost), these two agents are recognized with social intentions. To test the above hypothesis, we manipulated the theory of minimizing costs by presenting cartoonized animations that depict how two agents move and influence each other. Specifically, a movable Agent A placed an apple in front of Agent B, who is always stationary. In front of Agent B, a fence was either set in place or not, to operationalize the costs of Agent B achieving the target (i.e., the apple). In this case, when a fence was placed in front of Agent B, his path of achieving the target was blocked; accordingly, when Agent A pushed the apple to the front of Agent B and helped Agent B achieve the target, the costs of Agent B (i.e., path) to achieve the target were less than when Agent B achieved the target alone. However, when there was no fence in front of Agent B, the costs of Agent B achieving the target alone were less than the costs of Agent A helping Agent B to achieve the target. In brief, only when there was a fence in front of Agent B, the actions of Agent A in placing the apple in front of Agent B aligns with the information of minimizing costs, and can be recognized as a social intention; when there was no fence in front of Agent B, the object-directed intention should be attributed, as Agent A approached the target of the apple. To identify the recognized intentions of actions, we measured μ suppression (electroencephalogram oscillations within the 8~13 Hz range in the sensorimotor regions; namely, C3 and C4 channels) related to action understanding. It was suggested that the functional grouping of two individuals in social intentions should induce greater suppression of the representation of individual object-directed actions. To strictly control for the possible low-level differences, the action of Agent A, placing the apple in front of Agent B (i.e., transferring action) was paired with the action of Agent A, placing the apple in front of a stone (i.e., disposing action), which was typically recognized as an object-directed intention, whether the fence was present or not. Each action lasted two seconds, and participants were asked to count the fillers (i.e., incomplete actions) when watching the actions presented on the screen. In Experiment 1, when the fence was present in front of Agent B, the transferring action (M = -17.3% relative to the baseline) induced more μ suppression than the disposing action (M = -8.5%). More importantly, the occipital α with the same frequency band as μ was not modulated by the action type, but this component was suggested to be functional with attentional mechanisms. These results were further confirmed by cluster-based permutation tests without selecting the channels of interest. In Experiment 2, to test whether the effect in Experiment 1 was dependent upon the information of minimizing costs, the fence was removed and accordingly, the critical information was absent. We found that the difference in μ suppression between transferring and disposing actions was insignificant when the fence was not present. To further test the hypothesis proposed in this study, we used a behavioral indicator (i.e., measuring the sensitivity of changes). We manipulated the information of minimizing costs, as in Experiments 1 and 2, but participants engaged in a change detection task. In this task, a set of identical actions were memorized in sequence and participants were required to detect whether anything changed in the test animation compared to those previously memorized. It has been suggested that chunking results in more efficient processing of the configuration (e.g., encoding of interactants’ identity), but involves a cost for the individual parts within it, resulting in a memory confusion effect. Hence, if Agent A is perceived as having a social intention toward Agent B, they should be chunked in memory. Accordingly, participants would be less likely to detect changes within the interaction (i.e., the roles of Agents A and B in an interaction were swapped during the test; defined as role swap), but would be more likely to detect changes in pair composition (i.e., the recipient in an interaction was replaced by the recipient from another interaction, defined as structure change) relative to kinematically identical non-social transferring actions. It was found that in Experiment 3a, when the fence was placed in front of Agent B in the role swap condition, participants were more sensitive to such change in the disposing action (M = 1.97, SE = 0.25) than to the transferring action (M =1.38, SE = 0.24); by contrast, in the structure change condition, the sensitivity of detecting such change in the transferring action (M = 2.04, SE = 0.21) was higher than that of the disposing action (M = 1.51, SE = 0.23). In Experiment 3b, when there was no fence in front of Agent B, participants were even more sensitive to the role swap change than the structure change, but it was not influenced by the action type. It has been widely suggested that the disposing action is attributed to an object-directed intention (i.e., regardless of whether the fence was present or not) and the recognized social intention should induce greater suppression and higher sensitivity for a structure change and lower sensitivity for a role swap change than the recognized object-directed intention. Hence, we concluded that the results, in which the transferring action induced more μ suppression and higher sensitivity for a structure change and lower sensitivity for a role swap change than the disposing action (i.e., when the fence was present), were attributed to the fact that the transferring action was recognized as having a social intention. However, this recognition depends on the information of minimizing costs; otherwise, the difference in μ suppression and different sensitivities of changes between transferring and disposing actions would be observed as well, when the fence was not present. Hence, this study provides solid evidence that when the costs of Agent A helping Agent B to achieve the goal state are less than the costs of Agent B acting alone to achieve this goal state (i.e., minimizing costs), they are recognized with social intentions." "
Peer Review Status:Awaiting Review
Subjects: Psychology >> Cognitive Psychology submitted time 2020-02-21
Abstract： 针对动作理解的机制，模拟论主张大脑自发模拟他人的动作，就相同的动作其理解也相同，而理论论则认为人们基于合理性原则对他人动作进行推理，相同的动作发生在不同的情境时会有不同的理解。但目前所采用动作材料的运动学特性和发生情境存在共变，其难以区分动作理解是支持模拟论还是理论论。通过两项实验，采用动画制作技术来产生有无约束情境下的追逐动作，以指示动作加工过程的脑电μ抑制为指标，对前述两种观点进行了检验。其中，在约束情境中存在障碍物，追逐者需改变运动方向以绕过障碍物，从后方逐渐趋近目标；而无约束情境中不存在障碍物，但追逐者依然保持与存在约束情景下相同的运动模式。结果发现，当追逐动作发生在存在约束的情境时，其可基于合理性原则推测清晰的动作目标，该条件下的μ抑制程度高于不存在约束情境的条件(实验一)；而当仅追逐者运动，即趋近的目标不确定时，虽然有约束和无约束情境间的物理差异与实验一相同，但条件间μ抑制的差异消失(实验二)。其上述μ抑制并非与注意相关的枕叶α活动的泛化。该结果提示，动作发生的情境信息影响人们对动作的理解，即基于推理过程理解动作，支持理论论观点。
Subjects: Psychology >> Cognitive Psychology Subjects: Psychology >> Social Psychology submitted time 2020-02-20
Abstract： Reward-based learning plays an important role in selective attention. Recent studies have indicated that rewarded stimuli capture more attention after participants directly learned the association between the stimulus and reward, either presented as money or as social feedback. In addition to engaging in direct learning, people can acquire knowledge of stimuli by observing others, and how to interact with and respond to external stimuli. To adapt to our social world, it is critical to gain reputation information by observing whether people interact with each other positively or negatively. However, it remains unclear whether the valence of social actions influences the attentional priority of valence-associated stimuli. Therefore, the present study employed a widely used training-testing paradigm to investigate the influence of the valence of social actions on attentional capture. Three experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, the distractors in the actor’s color associated with positive (i.e., helping actions) or negative (i.e., hindering actions) valence of social actions were shown in a visual search task. We examined whether the attentional capture effect was influenced by the valence of social actions and whether the effects were different between positive and negative social actions. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether the attentional capture effect of the recipient’s color was influenced by the valence of social actions as well. To further examine the attentional priority between two individuals’ features involved in the negative social interaction, we directly compared the attentional capture effect between the actor’s color and the recipient’s color from the negative social interaction (i.e., hindering action) in Experiment 3. In the learning phase, participants were required to watch cartoonized videos adapted from Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom (2007). In these videos, an actor interacted with a recipient in one of four different modes: valid helping (the actor helps the recipient successfully), invalid helping (the actor repeats the same action as helping but without effects on the recipient), valid hindering (the actor hinders the recipient successfully), and invalid hindering (the actor repeats the same action as hindering but without effects on the recipient). In this case, the valid helping action was more positive than invalid helping action in valence, but with the same action pattern, and the valid hindering action was more negative than invalid hindering action in valence, but with the same action pattern. During the testing phase, each trial started with the presentation of the fixation display (400~600ms), which was followed immediately by the search display (1500ms or until response). In the search display, the target was defined as the form singleton (e.g., one diamond among circles), while a distractor was a color singleton (additional-singleton) colored the same as the agent in the previously learned videos. Inside the target, a white line segment was oriented either vertically or horizontally, and inside each of the nontargets, a white line segment was tilted at 45° to the left or to the right. The search display was followed by a feedback display (1000ms), which informed participants whether their responses in the previous trial were correct. In the training phase, participants were able to successfully learn the association between agents’ color and their interaction information through observation, and the memory performance was not modulated by the interaction mode. However, in the test phase, the results showed that (1) In both Experiments 1 and 2, participants’ reaction time in the search display was longer when the additional-singleton distractors were shown than when none of the additional-singleton distractor were shown , which was referred to as a significant standard additional-singleton effect, suggesting that attention was captured by the additional-singleton distractor; (2) the attentional capture effect was significant when the additional-singleton distractor was associated with the valid hindering condition than when the additional-singleton distractor was associated with the invalid hindering condition, while no difference in the attentional capture effect was observed between valid and invalid helping conditions; (3) whether the additional-singleton distractor’s color was from the actor or the recipient involved in the negative social interaction, the attentional capture effect was present, but the additional-singleton distractor’s color associated with the actor showed a larger attentional capture effect than that associated with the recipient. Hence, our results demonstrate that the valence of social actions influences attentional capture, and this influence is shown as a negative bias for valence-associated stimuli. In addition, this association is established on all agents involved in the social action, instead of the actor alone, and the actor’s features in the negative social interaction are prioritized to be attended than the recipient. These findings highlight how attention is related to social actions, suggesting an adapted function of negative social actions.
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